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I.  Introduction 
Work in the 21st century, and the organizations within which work takes place (including the 
networks of relationships that complement or replace formal organizations), has been 
changing rapidly (e.g., Barley & Kunda 2001).  As has happened frequently in the study of 
organizations, the world of practice leads the world of theory.  While organizations struggle 
to survive and thrive in this post-bureaucratic world, organization theorists struggle to 
theorize about, support, or even help lead these changes.   
 
In this paper, we examine the changing nature of systems engineering work and, in 
particular, how The MITRE Corporation is confronting the challenges of expanding its role 
and capabilities to deliver what it calls “Enterprise Systems Engineering” to its government 
clients1.  Systems engineers exemplify technical knowledge workers whose work is 
expanding beyond the traditional skills and habits of thought developed through their 
disciplinary training (cf., Davidz 2006).  Changes in technology, systems acquisition 
                                                 
1  MITRE comprises several Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) which are 
chartered by sponsoring departments or agencies of the federal government of the United States, such as the 
Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Treasury.   
practices, and enterprise structures are challenging systems engineers to expand their roles 
and capabilities to manage the boundaries among technological systems and organizations of 
many sizes and types (e.g., government customers, systems integrators, suppliers, end users).  
Systems development takes place in an ever more complex environment of inter-
organizational enterprises where implementation increasingly catalyzes enterprise change 
and demands greatly expanded and often unrecognized roles beyond that of technical expert 
or project manager. 
 
Since MITRE’s early days, when there was more emphasis on designing and developing 
custom-built systems for individual agencies (commonly referred to as “stovepipe” or “silo” 
systems), MITRE has had to face two main expansions of complexity relative to its 
engineering work activity, the first technological and the second organizational.  First, under 
the rubric of “information superiority,” a shift from custom-built systems to the use of 
information technology (IT) for communication, command and control systems (referred to 
as “software-intensive systems”) has been going on for over twenty years.  Systems 
engineering, a discipline traditionally oriented towards design, development and testing of 
standalone weapons and radar systems, struggles with geometrically cascading 
interdependencies driven and shaped by IT (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt 1988; Leveson 2004).  
The upstream suppliers of IT are less likely to be large system contractors and more likely to 
be commercial product vendors selling commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies.  
Second, MITRE’s downstream customers are less likely to be single organizations looking 
for standalone (“stovepipe”) systems and more likely to be multiple organizations seeking 
inter-organizational networked systems.  In a recent survey of senior systems engineers at 
MITRE, the organizational and political aspects of major projects are considered to be at 
least as challenging as the technical aspects (Rashid 2008).  
 
Our ideas emerge from five empirical case studies of systems development and enterprise 
change involving clients of The MITRE Corporation.  Our grounded, socio-technical 
approach considers both the work activity and the practical implications of the technologies 
that comprise much of the work substance and product.  Through focusing on the work of 
systems engineers, we identify patterns of change and development in the nature of work, 
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organizations, industries, and institutions.  Our objectives are to empirically ground and 
enrich social science theories of technological and enterprise innovation with data about the 
work (Barley 1996; Barley & Kunda 2001; Dunbar & Starbuck 2006) as well as to transform 
practical field experience into useful and transferable knowledge for systems engineers and 
other agents of change and for organizations like MITRE that are developing new 
capabilities in the post-bureaucratic world of knowledge work. 
II. Literature Review 
Systems Engineering 
Systems Engineering began as a sub-discipline of engineering during the late 1940s and 
1950s when the development of weapons systems and aerospace systems were getting 
beyond the scope and tools of separate engineering disciplines (Johnson 2003; Sapolsky 
2003).  By offering the label of “system,” the focus was placed on the technical system being 
engineered, such as a missile or airplane, rather than on the component pieces that were the 
responsibility of discipline-based subteams and subcontractors. 
 
The field of Systems Engineering has continued to grow as more large-scale systems are 
developed in military and civilian applications.   The term “system-of-systems” is routinely 
applied to distinguish this work from typical systems engineering (Keating, Rogers, Unal & 
Dryer 2003).  As corporations outsource many parts of the supply chain, some have taken a 
specialized strategic role as “systems integrator.”  Boeing for example no longer “makes” 
planes but rather does overall design and some assembly, with manufacturing technology 
increasingly outsourced.  MITRE provides primarily systems engineering services (systems 
architecture, oversight of suppliers), particularly around new information technologies but 
increasingly around broader systems-of-systems.  MITRE has identified “Enterprise Systems 
Engineering” or “Advanced Systems Engineering” as a set of skills and capabilities to 
provide clients with systems even more complex than systems-of-systems. 
 
The major activities within systems engineering are systems analysis, acquisition and supply, 
project management, system design (requirements and specifications) and integration, 
implementation or transition to use, and technical evaluation (Martin 2000; Johnson 
3 
2003:36).  The most recent and widely-disseminated definition of systems engineering says 
that  
Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the 
realization of successful systems…  Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines 
and specialty groups into a team effort forming a structured development process that 
proceeds from concept to production to operation.  Systems Engineering considers 
both the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a 
quality product that meets the user needs. (INCOSE 2008) 
 
Taking a resource-based view of the firm, Hobday, Davies and Prencipe (2005) argue that 
systems integration (a component of systems engineering) is a strategic core capability of 
contemporary high-technology firms, crucial for the development of complex products and 
services such as telecommunications networks, aircraft, etc.  In commercial enterprises, 
systems integration is usually accompanied by strategic management of component and 
subsystem supplier networks and/or financial and operational services, although this is less 
true in MITRE’s case.2  Davies (2003) and Hobday, et al. (2005) also note that core 
capabilities can shift up and down the value stream depending on the company’s traditional 
competencies and the particular product under development.    
 
Although systems engineering is taught in many universities, there are few places to learn 
more advanced systems engineering skills in academic settings.  Davidz (2006) studied how 
systems engineers learn systems thinking skills.  The primary source was through work 
experience, specifically involvement in and leadership of increasingly complex projects.  A 
second source was life experience outside work.  Academic training can support this kind of 
skill development but cannot be the primary source, because this type of knowledge is 
context-rich and practice-based.  The formal tools of traditional systems engineering, such as 
requirements definition, proposal solicitation and evaluation, source selection, program 
management, integration testing, risk management, and configuration management presume a 
degree of predictability and hierarchical authority that is not readily available in government 
enterprises. 
                                                 
2 This difference may help account for many of the difficulties that MITRE’s ESE efforts are encountering (see 
Practical Implications section below).  
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Government Enterprises 
Government enterprises are the clients of MITRE and the sources of our case studies.  By 
“enterprise” we refer to sets of organizations brought together to produce a product or service 
on a large scale.   Swarz and DeRosa (2006, p. 3), in a MITRE report, define enterprise as  
a collection of systems whose operational capabilities are inextricably intertwined 
with considerations of people, processes, and technology, whose boundaries are often 
imprecise, and which can often be characterized by a set of special, additional 
properties, such as emergent behavior, non-determinism, and environmental 
dependencies.   
 
Their definition is certainly complex and signals the cross-boundary nature of enterprises.  
Whereas government (and the corporation) has traditionally been organized in separate 
activities, there is an increasing demand and mandate (from Congress and/or the President) to 
work across organizational boundaries for system-wide outcomes.  More than a dozen 
civilian agencies have been consolidated into the Department of Homeland Security.  The 
military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) have also been pressured to collaborate as a 
single “Joint” force, and are now dealing with Department of Defense mandated 
“Transformation of Force Structure” in addition to an ongoing transition toward “net-centric 
operations.”  The Intelligence Community is undergoing a major reorganization.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration faces daunting challenges in managing the National Air Space 
(NAS) due to sizable increases in both diversity and volume of air traffic.  As government 
agencies strive to operate as integrated enterprises with common purpose, their technological 
systems (information, communication, etc.) and administrative systems (acquisition, costing, 
etc.) are also changing and sometimes leading change.  Our MITRE case studies illustrate the 
process of merging separate legacy systems with new and more integrated technologies to 
serve enterprises. 
 
Government enterprises in the US face particular structural challenges – arising from unique 
combinations of workforces, culture, and business practices – that impede their ability to 
effectively manage change.  A majority of personnel in both the civil service and military 
command are long-term (lifetime) employees enjoying considerable job security.  At the 
same time, top managers of government agencies are more often in office for only limited 
durations, either as political appointees or from military career-path rotations, therefore 
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having few incentives for long-term commitment to a specific agency.  Thus, mid- and 
lower- level government employees, faced with pressure from the top, may find it expedient 
to simply resist change by waiting for leader-initiated changes to “blow over” (as leaders 
leave).  There also is no culture of bottom-line profit creating a shared goal for middle 
managers and no single leader to unify separate agencies (Presidents have not typically 
involved themselves in this way).  As a result, members of the workforce sometimes 
experience an unpredictable stream of leadership changes, budget cuts, and program 
cancellations. 
 
There are comparable challenges in the institutional arrangements for “acquisition” or the 
contractual, legal, and regulatory arrangements for how new technological systems are to be 
funded, built, and fielded.  Tightly constrained budgetary cycles are insensitive to emergent 
requirements and contingencies.  Fast-paced streams of technological innovation clash with 
slower-paced integration processes (cf. Ancona & Waller 2007), and emerge as conflicts 
between satisfying new requirements and avoiding risks to current functionality.  Budget 
processes require strict cost accountability, especially according to Congressional districts, 
which encourages competition among suppliers and localities; the result is stovepipe 
technological systems and fiefdoms with continual power struggles, rather than functionally 
integrated enterprises.  Political conflicts involving information systems are common 
(Feldman & March 1981) and the inherent relational tensions of coordinating technological 
design across organizations (O’Sullivan 2006) are accentuated at the enterprise scale.  
Stakeholder groups whose cooperation is essential to the enterprise routinely mistrust and 
misunderstand each other:  there are huge differences in language and philosophy between 
technologists, managers, policymakers, and members of the civil and military services 
(customers/users) (Schein 1996). 
The Role of Technology and Systems Engineers in Enterprise Change 
Systems engineers are in some ways well-equipped and in other ways ill-equipped to act as 
change agents in government enterprise transformation.  Technological seduction (Schein, 
1996) is one way to begin large-scale change, i.e., by building a new information system or 
other process that will act as a fulcrum for change in behavioral routines.  If legacy systems 
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that could not talk to each other can now share information, more than data may be shared:  
terminology, mindsets, goals, and attitudes begin to shift as well (Malone 2004).  The 
technology can be the “tip of the spear” in promoting enterprise integration, and the 
technologists appear to be wielding that spear and to be granted legitimacy or status because 
of their role in producing the technology.  MITRE’s specialty of systems integration in 
particular is growing and emerging as a key vehicle for organizing networks of production 
within and across the broader society (Hobday, et al. 2005).  
 
Engineers in general, whether through temperament, selection, or acculturation, deeply 
believe in the ability of technology to solve problems.  They love a challenge and jump 
readily into problem-solving mode to find solutions.  They are bold, if not immodest, in 
offering solutions.  However, engineers less often understand the human and organizational 
aspects of these problems.  System designers may assume that users will think and act the 
way an engineer would, and not listen sufficiently to users (or believe they know better).  A 
functional improvement that “solves the problem” may be resisted because it undermines the 
capabilities or status of particular groups.  Emergent social behaviors in reaction to 
technological change (Barley 1986; Orlikowski 1992) render traditional planning tools 
ineffective (Suchman 2007).  It is a rare engineer who is also politically-savvy and 
organizationally-adept.  Yet that is exactly the combination of skills needed for enterprise 
systems engineers, i.e., to combine traditional systems engineering tools and skills with 
broader systems thinking that includes both technical and socio-organizational systems and 
the interpersonal and political skills to persuade and build trustful relationships among a wide 
range of stakeholders. 
 
III. Methods 
In consultation with MITRE management, five technology development programs were 
identified as potential subjects for in-depth study and analysis via case studies.  The case 
study approach (Eisenhardt 1989; Markus & Lee 1999; Yin 2003) was selected to provide a 
narrative history of the program (including major stakeholders, timeline of major events, key 
participants, important decisions, and key outcomes) and to explore the multitude of factors 
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that were thought to be potentially relevant in understanding “complex social phenomena” 
(Yin 2003, p. 2) in a technical environment.  The selected projects had an enterprise 
component and were to be actively under development.  Program durations range from just a 
few years to almost 30 years of existence.   
 
The major data collection was through semi-structured interviews, with a common protocol.  
Individuals were nominated by management as possible interview subjects based on their 
current or past affiliation with the project.  Three to six individuals were ultimately 
interviewed for each technology program; their identity was kept confidential.  Interviews of 
60-90 minutes duration were conducted in a conference room or in the individual’s office.  A 
MITRE engineer on our research team was present to ask the questions, pursue any follow-
up questions, and to provide any technical insight that might be required during the interview 
session.  One to three note-takers were present or were connected to the interview session via 
teleconference call.  Transcribed interview notes, in conjunction with project documents, 
direct observation, and other program-related materials, were the sources from which we 
wrote and developed the case studies. 
 
Written case study drafts were provided to all interview participants for their review and 
feedback on accuracy, completeness, and general tone.  Since direct quotes were sometimes 
used in the case study write-ups, interviewees were allowed to request that quotes not be used 
or be modified to provide greater anonymity.  Revisions were made based on the feedback 
received and the cycle was repeated until we reached consensus among participants and 
review by the technology program managers and MITRE’s Engineering Council and senior 
management.   
IV. Analysis 
Due to confidentiality concerns, we cannot describe each case in detail.  (A brief summary of 
each case is provided below in Table 1.)  Rather, we assemble our observations and analyses 
into two major sections corresponding to the challenges MITRE faces in developing 
Enterprise Systems Engineering:  integrating changing technologies and systems, and 
satisfying changing customer requirements. 
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 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Integrating Changing Technologies and Systems 
Virtually all of the enterprise systems engineering programs we studied encountered 
engineering management challenges regarding the integration of technologies.  With the 
advent of networking technology, many formerly standalone systems associated with 
separate government agencies are now being interconnected to support flows of information 
between (formerly separate) agencies.   This interconnection is not a simple process and the 
change is not occurring overnight.  Much of it involves creating new boundaries around 
collections of legacy systems under a new program identity, and then integrating newly 
developing technologies and systems into the mix.   
Part of the strategy is naming.  People get used to a name and what it means and its 
scope and how to communicate in their … environment.  [Program] has been around 
4-5 years.  [Program] is not a big-bang type of program, it is evolutionary.  Didn’t 
start from green field, started from existing baseline.  Existing capabilities at 
operational commands were isolated, developed capability.  Headquarters evolved 
over time to more integrated. [P51:1] 3 
 
Integration challenges most commonly manifest as concerns over establishing and 
maintaining interoperability across legacy systems and with new innovations, so that data 
and communications can proceed across systems in a way that is transparent to users:  
“Basically it’s migrating legacy applications, getting rid of some things, adding new ones.”  
[P47:2]  
 
Traditionally, systems engineering methods for achieving interoperability and avoiding 
redundancies rely on formally structured processes.  In these, various modules of the 
technology proceed through a series of stages (requirements, design, development, 
integration, and testing), relatively in sync with each other, facilitating integration.  However, 
in larger enterprises with different systems and technologies evolving at different rates, 
                                                 
3 By convention, “[P51:1]” and other similar annotations are indexes to passages and/or paragraphs within the 
interview transcripts. 
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component technologies must be (continuously) integrated across different stages.  As one 
interviewee noted:  
[We are currently at] all different stages.  This is a rolling program of all these 
different capabilities.  Some have been signed off and are being deployed.  Some 
already in use.  Some deployed only one place.  A big transition management 
program.  Training, interoperability within and external to [Organization], consistent 
with national security problem.  Many moving parts, [which] constantly move.   
People tend to look at a program as static.  [This program] is constantly moving. 
[P53:1] 
 
Applications have to be developed by industry in netware environment; they can’t be 
developed in isolation.  If Company A is developing a stovepipe application (what it 
is, in reality), if there are about 20 of those, [then there are about] 20 dissimilar tools 
which don’t come together as a toolkit. They are at different stages [of the life cycle], 
some embryonic.  They/we will encounter requirements nobody indicated, new 
techniques, tools, the platform [operating system] they’re riding on will change.  (e.g. 
XML is evolving, several different paths possible).  Always the one that compromises 
us is security/ info assurance.  And strategic partnerships are not under our control 
(e.g. Microsoft).  [P48:4; P49:9] 
 
And while planners are trying to lay the groundwork for future integration challenges, the 
technology keeps changing. “The [linking technology] we’re delivering is already out-of-
date, before it’s delivered.  You’re always chasing what the [linking technology] should look 
like.”  [P39:10]  Another project interviewee stated, “Operationally, it is difficult to predict…  
The network could be really shaken up in the future because you don’t really fully know how 
it’s going to be done.”  [P40:13] 
 
Systems Integration Management Practices 
How then are systems engineers managing the job of system integration?  At a basic level, 
engineers rely heavily on schedules and other boundary objects (Star 1989; Carlile 2002) 
detailing all activities and tasks that affect interdependencies between components, and 
adhere closely to these.  Changes are typically authorized and processed through some kind 
of release authority such as a configuration management board.   
 
Integrated schedules which list all activities needed and a set of tasks which we 
adhere to.  Configuration management board where we don’t release anything without 
approval.  Manage the process. We rely on an initiative or other providers to build 
products - we do integration.  We really work in integration - worry about touch 
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points, sharing drawings, threads to show what will happen.  We need to share info.  
Architecture/system diagrams to show this.  Diagrams to monitor and configure 
activities.  [P3:2; P4:5] 
 
One particularly successful strategy for integrating such information systems appears to be 
provisionally accepting large numbers of new candidate technologies, testing them against a 
baseline, and then moving ahead with those deemed successful.  This is usually carried out as 
an iterative process extending over multiple years and called a “spiral development” model.   
 
Unlike [the old] waterfall methodology, they divide the system into smaller 
components, and develop and procure them separately.   The way I describe it is as 
about 100 spiral development projects that magically integrate into one system.  … 
[They are at] different stages and levels of complexity.  My fear is they have different 
reference architectures which will probably be incompatible.  Kind of a mix of legacy 
systems and new.  [P47:3] 
 
Strategy is to experiment with technology capability and process to further command 
and control process and systems.   Procedures I work [involve a] 2 year cycle for new 
initiatives.  Scale down and sort through them - down select - to find number that 
meets set of criteria of agenda set by [Chief of Staff] of [Military Service].  Build up 
experiment in 3 spirals over 12 months, then [MainEx]…   
 
Spiral 1 is demos of some level of completion of initiatives. 
Spiral 2 we’ve integrated systems, and working on training plan (how would you use 
my plans and initiatives), practice executing a mission (400 people at [military base]) 
training them to use the tools 
Spiral 3 initiatives are operative now at 90-100% complete.  Training refined. Dress 
rehearsal. 
MainEx: simulations and aircraft really flying.  Look at capacity and processes and 
personnel. Evaluate.  [P3:7] 
 
Engineers are also shortening projects and contracts as adaptive strategies.   
 
They are following an evolutionary approach in which they’re breaking the larger set 
into sub-projects and phases of projects.  They are shortening the time to avoid 
requirements creep and are using a spiral development approach… Shorter project 
timelines helps to deal with changing constraints and changes in national policies.  
They are willing to cancel or change projects.  Contractually, they are operating on 
task order contracts, which allow them to adapt to changes and allows to multiple exit 
points where they can decide whether to renew the contract.  [P52:5] 
 
One other earnest effort to rein in this task in a manageable fashion is the strategy of hiring a 
Program Management and Implementation Contractor (PMIC).  This has been tried on a number 
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of large programs and it does to some extent address the “multiple stakeholders with competing 
agendas, no one leader effectively in charge, and no agreed upon metrics for success” – a PMIC is 
a leader effectively in charge – at least in name, at least for a while (until major changes come 
along which are outside the scope of PMIC’s formal responsibility).   
Satisfying Changing Customers and Requirements   
Engineering Management Challenges 
Accompanying the technological push from suppliers, systems engineers feel pulled in 
multiple directions by customers in achieving requirements definitions.  Increasingly 
government leaders are using new technology as an occasion for or a means to coordinate 
and consolidate the efforts of multiple agencies into enterprises that provide and share 
government services.  Rather than a single hierarchically-organized customer as in traditional 
systems engineering, enterprise systems engineering programs are therefore confronted with 
diverse and competing customer segments.   
 
The first customer-side challenge for enterprise systems engineers is that there is rarely a 
single individual in charge of the entire enterprise who can mediate differences among the 
stakeholders or dictate final decisions.  Although government organizations sometimes have 
stable leadership, more often political appointees (and others) occupy their positions for a 2-
to-3 year period before moving on to other jobs.  This is enough time to plan for and start a 
transition or new program, but rarely enough time to complete it, leaving it for the next 
individual who brings their own agenda, goals, and new programs.  For example, “I put a 
significant piece of the blame on him, I don’t know where he went -- if you have short timers 
in those slots and they want to make their mark -- he pushed a lot of policy one worse than 
the other.”  [P42:10] 
 
Along with changing leadership within organizations is the division of interests within and 
between organizations.  It’s not surprising to hear that different branches of the military have 
their own way of doing things and therefore resist creating a unified system that would 
change their own ways of working:   
Customer base - decomposed into air, land, maritime.  Commanders want 
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interoperability.  To become streamlined, need to force standardization onto people 
who don’t want it.  I want to give them something they don’t know, but will want in 
the future.  [P53:8]   
 
But there is also considerable variation within organizations: “[Project] runs as part of 
somebody else’s system… without process, have to figure out what they are doing (8 
different ways just within [a Military Service]).” [P40:8] 
 
Evident to some degree across all the cases is a major tension between organizational efforts 
concerned with long range future planning and innovation (R&D) on the one hand, and those 
efforts primarily concerned with satisfying current operational needs on the other hand. 
Supporting the former are senior officials primarily focused on long term capabilities and/or 
interested in establishing (or enhancing) their reputations as innovative leaders (especially 
under the “information superiority” banner), along with technology vendors and others 
arguing that government investments in innovative technologies are crucial drivers of the 
country’s economic engine.  Supporting the latter are people working in the field using the 
current (legacy) systems who are more often concerned with getting their jobs done (e.g. 
fighting and winning a war) than experimenting with not-yet-fully-stabilized new 
technologies.  Once a new technology has met with user acceptance in the field, the same end 
users are often only interested in incremental improvements.  For example,  
…within the [Military Service].  There are loosely two camps.  One camp tend to 
emphasis leap-ahead capability.  Their focus is on the 15 [units] to be fielded 
beginning in 2016-17.  The other camp tend to emphasize more rapid fielding across 
the broader force (e.g., lower-cost, good enough capabilities).  Their focus was on the 
other 200+ modular force [units].  [P63:1] 
 
Not surprisingly, maintaining control over the requirements process is nearly impossible as 
each customer group pushes for its interests and desires and (given the timeframe for large 
projects) changing technologies lure customers into escalating demands.  For example, in 
discussing tensions over requirements, one interviewee referred to “the usual ‘food fight’ 
with user community about what will meet their expectations” [P48:8].  In discussing the 
overall planning process, another interviewee said, “had the Enterprise community 
understood the scope of the endeavor, we never would have embarked on it with the 
framework we did.  We had a schedule and cost estimates that are ‘silly’, unrealistic, when 
one understands the scope of the activity.” [P7:17]  Requirements churn as technology and 
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strategy shift over time: “About two years later, with net-centricity, goals morphed, to 
support advanced capabilities, mainly in [linking technology].  To do everything for 
everyone.”  [P43:1]   “Building based on requirements today, to be implemented in 5-6 years 
from now…. It’s not (been working), and I don’t see us changing the paradigm.” [P39:12] 
 
A third challenge for managing these projects is that government organizations have few 
bottom line measures (for-profit organizations can at least measure profit) to drive 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness and to stimulate coordination with other related 
organizations.  Many outdated institutional routines which used to facilitate long range 
planning and budgeting are not only still in place but still legally mandated (something which 
the engineers have no control over whatsoever).  Improvised solutions and processes 
sometimes degenerate into a free-for-all with the strongest political and/or budgetary muscles 
winning.    
Original requirements were very ambitious… do everything for everyone and in a 
short time frame.  Had such good top-cover that no one could say ‘the Emperor had 
no clothes.’  [P43:1]   
 
[Customer] was an 800 lb. gorilla, enjoyed senior level support.  When [Customer] 
says program will suffer without [Program], [Program] gets support…  not resource-
constrained.  [Customer] is not driven by [cost/benefit analysis]: ‘Capability-be-
damned—don’t bother me with the bills!’  [P43:1] 
 
Adaptive Engineering Practices 
To deal with these evolving complexities, engineers are developing several adaptive 
engineering practices.  However, these are inventions and improvisations, as one interviewee 
offered: “Trying architecture, requirements, specs.  People are already building things...  
trying to capture that, and see if it works. Other things start clean.  So, we’re a little broken in 
my mind.” [P39:6]  “It’s broken, but not sure that it can be done in any other way.” [P41:4] 
 
More intensive user involvement seems important: “Ad hoc process… requirements 
‘discovered’ through frequent user interaction.” [P5:4]  But there is a tension associated with 
placing advanced prototypes in front of end users.  On the one hand, users often want what 
they see, even when the prototypes are not truly functional (the software/IT community refers 
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to the Wizard of Oz epithet, “Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!”), which leads 
to ‘requirements creep’; but otherwise users, especially warfighters in the midst of combat, 
may refuse upgrades with inevitable glitches and problems that jeopardize their current 
operational mission.  
 
From the perspective of keeping operations going, approaches such as “interim solutions,” 
fielded prototypes, and service-oriented architectures are becoming the norm, with 
integration “successes” emerging out of orchestrated field “experiments.”  “Many others feel 
that as well, and are pursuing alternative interim solutions (they use the term ‘interim’ to get 
it approved).”  [P43:1]  But this is a new set of skills for engineers and managers:  
We’re trying to get interfaces on change control, so we drew a line around our stuff, 
created a boundary so now instead of development, we’re now participating in 
management of boundary.   So if your stuff works we’ll use it, great.  If not, sorry, we 
can’t work with you.  So we’re more management activities than engineering design 
activities.  A good engineer has skills for both, but probably an engineer feels more 
worth if working on design and engineering of new capabilities than on plumbing.  
[P1:6] 
 
IV. Discussion 
Our results demonstrate that the work practices of systems engineers are coming under 
increasing pressure from ever more complex projects, rapidly-shifting technology from 
suppliers, and conflicting demands from customers who want new functionality and 
interoperability without giving up their current systems or experiencing interruptions that 
challenge their current mission.  Systems engineers are responding with more intensive use 
of existing tools, such as budgets and schedules, but more importantly with evolutionary, 
adaptive approaches, increased customer contact, and improvisation.  They are moving 
towards the ‘bricolage’ approach to technical entrepreneurship (Garud & Karnoe 2003).  At 
an organizational level, MITRE is supporting this research to bring together the lessons 
learned from this decentralized activity and determine how it can build capability for serving 
customers. 
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We begin the discussion with an explication of three issues that have emerged from the 
results.  True to our focus on the work of systems engineers, the first issue is that among our 
five case studies there are two major kinds of projects that unfold differently in terms of the 
role of technology, consensus building, and timing.  We then consider the omnipresent issue 
of centralizing vs. decentralizing planning and control.  Last, we look at the habits of thought 
that underlie systems engineering skill sets.  We continue the discussion by highlighting the 
contributions that we hope to make to organization theory and MITRE’s practice.  We close 
with a discussion of the limitations of our research and the need for further study. 
Two Kinds of Programs 
Looking across the five cases, there is a distinction between programs primarily chartered to 
develop a specific new technological capability – especially when it is intended as an 
integrating device across diverse and previously disconnected organizations – and those 
primarily intended to update and integrate an information system comprised of a broad range 
of legacy and new technologies for a particular operational community.  Our interpretation of 
these kinds of projects is that the former is a strategy of using technology to lead community 
development, in short, to get disparate user communities to work together around the new 
technology.  In contrast, the latter projects have technology following the needs of an 
existing user community.   
 
From our small number of cases, we observe that projects that emerged around a voluntary 
federation of organizational units present a relatively smooth transition to a stable set of 
requirements and relatively more successful project results.  Although the engineering 
challenges of keeping up with rapid changes in available technologies and making them 
interoperate are daunting, they are still of a routine nature for systems engineers.  In contrast, 
managing diverse customers and fluid requirements is not within the skill set of most systems 
engineers.  One of our cases that we and our interviewees consider successful is from NATO 
and primarily based on publicly-available data such that it warrants a summary discussion.   
 
As an international political and military alliance, NATO has had to address management of 
political differences from its inception.  Rather than use “C2” for “Command and Control”, 
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NATO uses the acronym “C3” to signify “Consultation, Command and Control”– where the 
“Consultation” reflects concern with political rather than strictly military missions.  The 
checks and balances of the consensus decision making process, with attention to economic 
benefits as well as technical rigor, and each contributing member nation having a vote, seems 
to be a workable solution to avoid later disagreements. 
 
While there are inherent tensions, explicit recognition and legitimation of these tensions via 
organizational structures and policies may facilitate productive approaches to resolving them.  
For example, the explicit chartering of formally distinct organizational units for managing 
operations and transformation may bring tensions between stability and change into the open 
where they can be addressed in a productive way.  Similarly, a “host nation” policy which 
explicitly acknowledges the economic benefit awarded to participating nations and provides 
a channel for maintaining equity around the awards, may serve to stem the tide of conflict 
that would otherwise emerge.  In short, conflict management is routinized and placed early in 
the process instead of being ignored and allowed to emerge disruptively later on. 
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of NATO’s approach to systems engineering, particularly 
systems integration, is the Capability Package process.  The Capability Package unites 
financial, technical, and organizational – including inter-national – dimensions of an 
enterprise in a single process. It is an agreed-upon process that initiates funding and 
facilitates budget planning, placing financial responsibility within a single funding vehicle 
and a specific organizational process. For the technical dimension, the Capability Package 
affords traceability of requirements, is used to validate requirements for a contractor 
Statement of Work (SoW) and supports “trace back” during the testing phase and/or when a 
project is no longer needed.  Thus, there is a consensus on the process for managing change 
around both innovation and implementation, and it generally works.   
 
In a different case that involves a more stable user community, it is instructive to examine how 
that stability was facilitated.  One individual in particular was repeatedly mentioned as perhaps the 
single most important linkage in creating and maintaining both technical and social connections 
across a globally-dispersed system.  He worked to “MITREize” people to make sure they 
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understood the MITRE approach before they were sent into the field to work in this environment.  
Personal relationships were created and developed through regular contact by phone, and he 
moved people around to different positions in different locations to create the right fit.  Personal 
visits to maintain eye-to-eye contact were also an important component in building and 
maintaining trust.  He created both a leaders conference and an annual worldwide technical 
conference to share information and ideas for this global IT environment.  These were intended as 
free-form discussions on hot topics and new technologies by intellectual leaders in the 
community, regardless of position, and they continue to this day.  The early years of this IT 
environment were noted as being especially exciting, fun, and challenging while collectively 
solving problems.  Even before the advent of e-mail, people were on the phone with one another 
to discuss ideas, inform each other of new technologies, and coordinate system design and 
technical development. 
 
On the other hand, in two of our cases, integration across users was mandated from above 
(e.g., “Jointness”), and the process was far more challenging.  Organizational consolidations 
among Federal government agencies are more commonly mandated (by the President, 
Congress, or high ranking officials), perhaps as a last resort when powerful stakeholders have 
different perspectives and conflicting goals.  The strategy emphasizes major leaps in 
technologically-defined capabilities and hopes to seduce competing factions into cooperating 
and exchanging information (cf. Schein 1996).  Especially when the downstream aspects are 
not stable, there is usually a struggle for control, with high-ranking government/military 
officials commandeering the technical programs for political advantage (Feldman & March 
1981).  
 
For systems engineering projects these political difficulties manifest as changing 
requirements, either the “requirements creep” of increasing scope or the “requirements 
churn” of back-and-forth change.  In one of our cases the conflict among customers 
manifested as a contest between sponsors of different technologies for the same end users, 
which we characterize as a “Feud.”  In another of our cases the diverse range of sponsors all 
supported the same technology but each added their own requirements onto the only “train 
leaving the station,” which they refer to as a “Rice Bowl.” 
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Centralization and Decentralization 
It is tempting to resolve conflicts by empowering a central authority, either a single leader or 
a headquarters group, to make decisions and enforce them over competing stakeholders.  
Centralized authority should bring consistency, clarity, and lower long-term costs.  Yet those 
doing the central planning often have only limited knowledge of the locally important issues, 
especially when designing for the future.  A “practical drift” occurs over time which 
incorporates local task orientations in place of “overly burdensome” global rules, yielding a 
more stable local state of affairs (Snook 2000, p. 200).  However, this “drift” also leads to a 
decoupling where local behavior and decisions become out of sync with the broader system, 
creating larger-scale inefficiencies and situations where significant problems can occur, such 
as the downing of the two Black Hawk helicopters by friendly fire (Snook 2000).   
 
The debate over ideal organization forms (Nohria & Eccles 1992; Mintzberg 1970) has 
continued for some time, including in the IT world (Evaristo, Desouza, & Hollister 2005; 
King 1983).   In many companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Ford, governance structures 
have alternated between centralized and decentralized approaches, depending upon the 
preferences of top-level management, budgets, and the capabilities of the technology of the 
day.  Organization theorists have suggested that alternating governance structures may even 
be preferable when there are both benefits and liabilities to a fixed choice between 
centralization and decentralization (Nickerson & Zenger 2002).  
 
In one of our cases, for example, the approach to system development in a global technology 
environment was originally decentralized to allow for the exploration of innovative new 
technologies, rapid experiments with small failures, and a focus on unique local needs.  Local 
technical successes could be scaled up to larger system-wide use as appropriate.  This 
bottom-up organizing was coordinated and monitored by the intense involvement of a 
MITRE lead engineer to build trust and maintain open communication across the 
organization.  During the long history of this program there have been periodic efforts to 
centralize planning for system architecture, technology development, and budgeting, 
followed by a slow drift toward a more local focus.  Budgets have generally been locally 
controlled.  However, the rapid evolution of technology capabilities led to difficulties in 
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sharing information, software version control, and hardware selection.  A recent effort to 
again gain some centralized control was captured in the comment, “He who has the gold, 
rules!” heard from several different sources in our case study research.  This shift to a 
centralized budget approach and more centralized planning may address some challenges in 
the near term, but runs the risk of creating others.   
 
Habits of Thought and Trustful Relations  
Organizations are not just formal reporting relationships and divisions of labor, roles, and 
rules.  Organizations are also interpretive systems, in that the formal structure is continually 
enacted according to the understandings of the participants whose actions constitute the 
formal structure and also modify it to suit changing circumstances and changing 
understandings (Orlikowski 2000; Weick 1979, 1995).  Schein (1996) suggests that there are 
typically at least three subcultures in organizations:  an operator culture or line organization 
that considers work to involve interconnected systems and cooperation among people; an 
engineering subculture that values technical, error-free solutions; and an executive subculture 
that focuses on the financial bottom line (see also Carroll 1998, who includes academic 
researchers as a fourth distinct subculture).   
 
MITRE represents an engineering-focused organization with a high proportion of engineers 
as employees and as managers.  Its customers have traditionally been on the technical side of 
their organizations, such as information technology.  Hence, the habits of thought and 
practices of MITRE and its customers were well aligned with the technical capabilities that 
MITRE brought to the engagement.  Trust was based on technical expertise, i.e., on 
capabilities necessary to solve the engineering problem or develop the new system 
architecture.  Engineering management was primarily top-down project management, based 
around culturally-accepted bases of authority and shared goals of solving interesting 
problems to the mutual benefit of customers and MITRE.  MITRE has generally been 
perceived by customers as objective, problem-focused, and technically-capable, and therefore 
trustworthy. 
 
20 
However, the new expansion into “enterprise systems engineering” brings with it new 
demands to work on problems that cut across disciplinary and organizational boundaries.  
MITRE engineers and project managers struggle to develop new habits of thought (cf. 
Dougherty 1990, 1992; Schein 1996) and new practices that will allow them to act 
effectively in this new kind of situation.  Technical problems now carry with them 
organizational, political, and cultural facets (Ancona, Kochen, Scully, Van Maanen & 
Westney 2005).  As one interviewee said, “We try to be flexible… Listen, offer 
suggestions… Compromise, negotiation, alternatives… How do we go from nothing to a 
system of systems? Compromise is a big part of it.” [P3:5]  Interoperability of technical 
systems also means agreement on principles of bringing groups together with different 
language, different priorities, different assumptions, etc.  Trust is built on personal integrity 
and ability to translate across multiple groups, to present issues in a way that achieves 
consensus.  
Contribution to Research on Systems Integration  
In contrast to the small existing literature on systems integration, which assumes a fixed 
customer base and relatively stable requirements (Davies 2003; Hobday, et al. 2005), several 
of our cases exhibit dynamic and conflicting customer groups.  Thus, we suggest a stronger 
role of feedback loops involving customers, or directly between customers and 
manufacturing (via changing requirements) as an area for further research, incorporating 
work on structuration of technology and organization (Barley 1986; Orlikowski 1992; 
DeSanctis & Poole 1994), as indicated in Figure 1 below.  On the systems engineering side, 
this suggests new skills in role taking, conflict management, and systems thinking (cf. 
Davidz 2006; Sterman 2000; Atwater, Kannan & Stephens 2008). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Although the problems experienced by engineers differ according to whether they are 
struggling with supply (technological integration) or demand (requirements) challenges, in 
both cases the underlying issues are closely tied to a pace of change so rapid that it prevents 
the kind of successful long-range planning traditionally central to the discipline of systems 
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engineering.  Traditional systems engineering approaches such as the waterfall method – 
predicated on long development cycles and emphasizing formally structured requirements, 
specifications, and integration testing at the end of the project – are no longer practical and 
new approaches such as spiral development are being tried.   
 
There is also an accelerating, self-reinforcing feedback process between the rate of 
technological advances and the appetite of those in power for “more, faster, capabilities.”  
Key stakeholders such as large contractors, technology vendors, and government leaders may 
all have incentives to feed the innovation cycle.  Engineering and political checks and 
balances are not always strongly in place.  Engineering organizations such as MITRE lack 
power over these stakeholders, although they have “influence,” and senior government 
officials may be unable (or uninterested) to keep their demands in line with what is 
technically feasible.  Indeed, in the military environment, this is exacerbated by the easy 
transition of early military retirees into lucrative second careers in defense industries (e.g., 
see Barstow 2008).  Our findings seem consistent with those of Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 
(1988) that in high velocity environments with rapid change in technology and demand, 
politics engendered through autocratic power centralization lead to diminished overall 
performance.  And the difficulties are especially significant since under conditions of 
increasing uncertainty and more rapid change, the development of dynamic capabilities 
becomes of even more strategic importance than control over resources (Augier & Teece 
2006). 
Practical Implications  
Focusing our investigation on the work activities of the systems engineers highlights the 
significance of systems integration in their project environments.  It also affords a window 
onto larger institutional changes, as the programs MITRE supports shift their center of 
gravity downstream from conceptual design of completely new technologies to systems 
integration of more commercial “off the shelf” (COTS) technologies (Davies 2003; Pavitt 
2003).  Many other contractors are experiencing similar changes from product to service, as 
in IBM’s “Services Science.”  In one of our cases, the contractor’s role “reduced significantly 
to a purely integration role.  They have gone from major development and maintenance 
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activities to just taking COTS and this government product and integrating and deploying.” 
[P5:2] 
 
MITRE was established in the late 1950s when the field of systems engineering and the 
industry structure were quite different.  While commercial firms now find it expedient to 
actively "manage" upstream suppliers of component parts and assemblies, the government 
programs that MITRE supports are limited to "influencing" upstream suppliers.  These 
programs are also legally constrained against providing the kind of operational and financial 
services that large, for-profit corporations involved in systems integration are providing as 
“integrated solutions.”    
   
As MITRE positions itself to provide enterprise systems engineering capabilities, it will 
likely need to go beyond asking its heavily involved systems engineers to add new skills to 
their technical expertise.  At some point, MITRE may find it worthwhile to engage with its 
sponsoring government agencies in this effort, revisiting details of its FFRDC charters in 
order to consider how it can best catalyze change in the contractual and organizational 
arrangements of enterprise systems engineering project work.  Similarly, there is increased 
need for thoughtful strategy about how MITRE can use its network of connections to 
influence underlying professional organizations to build trustful networks ahead of the need 
for specific technological change. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Of course, our research is based on only five case studies within a single and rather 
constrained (albeit significant) sector of government agencies.  Further, each case study is 
based on a small number of interviews, in most cases with only MITRE personnel rather than 
a sampling of stakeholders, including the users of these systems, with their various 
viewpoints.  Thus, we have a very particular, and possibly cloudy, window into the world of 
systems engineers and systems integrators.  Certainly, our immediate research is continuing 
to deepen our case studies with additional interviews and to broaden our sample of MITRE 
engagements.  Other researchers should complement this work with studies of other 
organizations. 
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 However, what we have found is consistent with much of the existing literature and suggests 
directions for research on work and organizations.  Indeed, we suggest that systems engineers 
are particularly well-positioned as ‘canaries in the coal mine’ to reveal elements of the 
emerging socio-technical realities of modern knowledge work.  As Hobday, et al. (2005) 
assert, “Systems integration is growing and emerging as a key vehicle for organizing 
networks of production within and across the broader society.”  Focusing a research lens on 
the people who carry out that work on a daily basis should afford especially valuable results.   
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Table 1 – Brief Summaries of Case Studies 
 
Operations Planning Tool 
Two separate, competing systems aimed at modernizing the software components for 
joint operations planning were merged.  One was a decade-long program that focused on 
incremental improvements to and upgrading of the existing legacy system through a 
highly structured engineering process.  The second used a more revolutionary, or 
“remove and replace,” approach based on the agile prototyping methodology to quickly 
develop new components.  It worked closely with operators to continually refine 
requirements and update system capabilities through “revolutionary” improvements 
rather than systematic upgrades.  User feedback was the primary source of feedback, 
rather than the traditional development and acquisition process.   Similar operational 
challenges were faced by both approaches, but were addressed with different contracting 
approaches with differing stakeholders, goals, timelines, incentives, and success metrics.  
A blended approach promised the benefits of both approaches without the limitations of 
either.  However, different subcultures founded on distinctly different engineering 
approaches have made it difficult to develop a common set of values to guide 
development.  These contradictory models have lead to “opponents competing rather than 
collaborating” in creating a cohesive enterprise that is focused on overall project success. 
 
Intelligence Information System 
The Intelligence Information System was created to support the communications and 
information needs of the military services and their major components.  Using a distributed, or 
decentralized, approach, major components were responsible for producing and maintaining 
data on a particular area of responsibility.  Further, each component had control over its own 
budget and had the flexibility to pick its own hardware, software, and data structures, creating 
the tendency to focus on local needs and requests.  A recent reconfiguring of the larger 
organization has occurred to focus on developing a globally-consistent, standardized IT 
enterprise with a centralized primary budget and planning authority.  Globally-synchronized 
data support centers have been developed to support access, mobility, world-wide login, a 
common analytical data set, enterprise storage, and failover and disaster recovery capabilities.  
A standardized approach was used to support consistent e-mail, desktop services, applications, 
and tools.  Continuous promotion of the centralized approach has been instituted with on-
going training underway. 
 
Linking Technology 
The Linking Technology project was initiated in the late 1990s to address challenges in 
tactical operational communications and coordination.  The goal was to develop software and 
hardware systems to support high capacity, highly networked, secure wireless 
communications that would be interoperable, affordable, and scalable.  The program 
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underwent a major reorganization in 2006 and the initial operational requirements have been 
approved.   
 
Automated Information System 
The Automated Information System (AIS) was chartered to provide an integrated set of 
services supporting consultation, command, and control across global operations.  
Initially created to integrate land and maritime information systems, AIS is now tasked 
with the technical integration of a large number of legacy systems with pre-existing sub-
projects, phases of projects, and fielded prototypes into a system that is both coherent and 
flexible.   Therefore, the program development strategy is not a “big bang” strategy, but 
an evolutionary one that is tied to the history of the international organization itself.  A 
range of enterprise systems engineering practices are being instituted.  The acquisition 
process is being re-defined with the intent of improving how it acquires (sub-)systems.  
To ease interoperability issues, an emphasis is now being placed on services rather than 
components.  The management and coordination of both external and internal 
stakeholders is normally well managed; management of the technical issues remains 
somewhat problematic.  Bids have recently been sought for a new contractor to handle 
program management and implementation.  Many were optimistic that solutions will be 
found because processes in this international organization have worked well historically. 
 
Program Coordination and Development 
An aging infrastructure and a projected two-to-threefold increase in system demand led to the 
creation of a Program Coordination and Development Office to coordinate the efforts of six 
existing federal agencies and the White House to address these system needs, with one federal 
agency assigned to oversee the creation of the system plan.  Industry and academia later joined 
the effort.  Safety, efficiency, quality, affordability, scalability, variability in equipment and 
participation, security threats, and an increasing concern for the environment also contributed 
to the complexity of the requirements for the evolving system.  Leveraging existing 
technology and infrastructure is important.  Emerging technologies and the ability to integrate 
data streams from multiple agencies and sources for improved situational awareness and 
global operations provide a glimpse of what is possible in the future.  Different stakeholders 
have conflicting agendas and perspectives on what is of highest importance and is affordable 
and reasonable.  Although mandated by Congress, achieving the goals of this development 
program in the projected time-frame will be difficult.  However, some recent and significant 
progress has been made. 
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